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Abstract-This paper develops a theoretical model about how risk-averse managers 
choose marketing policies under uncertainty in a mulridivision firm organized in in- 
dependent Strategic Business Units. We show that, even if the divisional and corporate 
managers have homogeneous attitudes towards risk, suboptimal marketing policies will 
be chosen in terms of price and marketing effort if the divisions are given autonomy. 
Furthermore, when market conditions for one division change, the corporate manager 
generally wishes the other divisions to revise their marketing policies as well. The 
direction of effect depends on the type of uncertainty in the sales response functions 
and on whether divisional cash flows are positively or negatively correlated. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper develops a theoretical model to determine the impact of uncertainty on mar- 
keting policies in a multidivision firm. In order to focus on strategic planning issues, we 
assume as Larreche and Srinivasan [6] that divisions are structured as Strategic Business 
Units (SBU’s) and that the only relationships among the cash flows of the SBU’s are 
stochastic (i.e., the policies of one division do not influence demand or cost conditions 
for other divisions). Furthermore, in order to focus on uncertainty-related issues, we 
assume that top management and the divisional managers have homogeneous attitudes 
to risk. Finally, for analytical tractability, we consider the single-period case. 
The main results are twofold. Firstly, from the corporate manager’s viewpoint, sub- 
optimal policies will be chosen if each SBU is allowed to choose its marketing policy 
independently. Specifically, if uncertainty is exogenous (i.e., the variability of sales is 
independent of marketing policies), divisional prices will be too low when divisional sales 
are negatively correlated. However, if the variability of sales depends on marketing policies 
(specifically, if the variability of sales increases with advertising and decreases with price), 
divisional marketing budgets will be too low when sales are negatively correlated. These 
results are independent of the precise forms of the sales response functions in the divisions. 
Finally, the comparative static results depend on both the type of uncertainty in the 
sales response functions and the stochastic interdependence of divisional cash flows. In 
particular, small changes in market conditions for one division (e.g., an increase in ad- 
vertising effectiveness) will, in general, require a change in marketing policies by other 
divisions. 
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The fundamental question is to determine the appropriate objective function for cor- 
porate planning purposes. In this paper, we follow the economic paradigm and assume 
that the manager chooses marketing policies to maximize expected utility (see. for ex- 
ample. the classic papers of Leland [7] and Sandmo [lo]). An alternative approach. popular 
in the finance literature, is to assume that the appropriate objective is value maximization. 
For a detailed discussion and comparison of the economic and finance paradigms, see 
Jagpal [3] and Brick and Jagpal [I]. 
THE MODEL 
Following Dhrymes [2], Lintner [8], and Jagpal and Brick [j], assume that, for each 
division, the utility function for wealth is exponential, risk-averse managers maximize the 
expected utility of wealth, and profits are normally distributed. Divisional manager i will 
then choose a marketing mix to maximize the certainty-equivalent of his division’s profit 
defined by: 
Vj(TIi) = E(IJj) - CXjU’ (KIj) (1) 
where IIf denotes the random profit conditional on a given marketing mix, u’(II;) denotes 
the variance of Iii and ai is one-half the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk-aversion. 
We consider the two-division case, assuming homogeneous risk-aversion for the divisional 
and corporate managers (a, = ~1~ = a). 
Let p, denote the price charged by the ith division, Mi the marketing effort, Fi the fixed 
cost and ci the unit variable cost of production, assumed constant over feasible levels of 
demand. Then, the divisional manager chooses policies (p,+, MT) to maximize the cer- 
tainty-equivalent of his division’s profit defined by 
‘i = (Pi - ci) E[@i(Pi, Mi, l(j)] - Fi - Mi - a(pj - ci)‘Var[@,(pi, Mi, Ui)] (2) 
where [Ii is a stochastic disturbance term and Qi(pi, Mi, ui) denotes the random demand 
for the ith division (d@ilapi < 0, aQi/aMi 3 0, a@ilaui > 0). 
However, the corporate manager will wish marketing policies (pj”*, MT*) which max- 
imize the certainty-equivalent of corporate profits defined by 
’ = F {(Pi - Ci) E[Qi(pj, Mi, L(i)] - Fi - Mj} 
I 
- CXU (pi - Ci)(pj - Cj)COV(@i, @j). C3) 
i.J’ 
Comparison of the policies (pi*, Mi*) and (pT*, MT*) follows under a number of plausible 
conditions. 
EFFECT OF FORM OF UNCERTAINTY 
Case 1: Exogenom uncertainty 
If the variability of demand in any division is independent of its marketing policies, 
then @i(p;, Mi, u;) = fi(p;, Mi) + IL; where E(ui) = 0. In order to compare the divisional 
policy (pi*. M?) and the corporate policy (pT*, M:*), it is sufficient to determine the 
signs of dp~*/da,, and aM::*/aalz where (J ,? = Cov(rl,, u2). Using the comparative static 
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methodology (see Appendix). we find 
I!1 
dp,“” 
- < 0 If 
aa,2 
012 < 0. (1) 
Hence the divisional manager will alvvays charge too low a price when the sales of the 
divisions are negatively correlated. 
However, as some tedious algebra shows. dM,**/da12 cannot be signed. Hence. without 
additional information, it is not possible to determine whether the divisional managers 
will choose marketing budgets which are too large or too small from the firm’s viewpoint. 
The variability of demand in any division may depend on its marketing policies. If 
@,(p;, M;. II,) = fi(pis illi)rli vihere I[, 2 0, the variability of sales increases vvhen mar- 
keting effort increases and decreases when price is raised.’ Proceeding as in the exogenous 
uncertainty case. it is necessary to sign dp,“*/da12 and &WYau12. 
Following the method shown in the Appendix, we can show that’ 
and dpi**/dul~ is indeterminate. Hence, regardless of the shapes of the sales response 
functions. both divisional managers will spend too little on marketing activities from the 
firm’s point of view if sales are negatively correlated. However. the prices charged may 
be too high or too low, depending on the parameters of the model. 
EFFECT OF PARAMETER CHANGES 
From a corporate policy viewpoint, it is useful to determine how divisional marketing 
policies should be modified when market conditions change. In general, the results are 
well-defined. Furthermore, even though market conditions may change in one division 
only, marketing policies of other divisions should be modified as well to maximize cor- 
porate performance. Because the derivations are tedious, we present the main results and 
provide a detailed example in the Appendix. 
In the analysis, it is necessary to interpret d’VldpidMi. If uncertainty is exogenous. 
the price-elasticity of expected demand is 
After differentiating and rearranging terms, we obtain 
Pi d’V -de as, 
(fi - Ci) d!MiE)pj 
=A+$ -& - 
dikli i ) ci Z (Pi - (.i) 
(6) 
(7) 
’ This scenario is intuitively plausible. However. it is possible to construct more general scenario using the 
specification cP,(,,. .\I,. 0,) = f,(p,. AI,) + g,(p,, .\I,)u, where dg;/@, and ~g,i,3.l/, are of unrestricted sign. For 
details. see Jagpal and Brick [J]. 
zSpecificaliy. d’l’idpI@2 = 0. J’V/J.LI,Jp, = 0 (i f j) and J’V/J.vl,JM, = -3uII(p, - c:) (Jf,lJ.\f,) 
(JfzlJ,M:). The result is obtained following the procedure in the Appendix. 
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where Z = I(p, - ci)ai, - l(p, - ~~)a,:. Henc sufficient conditions for d’VidlU,dpi > 
0 are that (a) the price-elasticity decreases wher marketing effort increases, and (b) the 
cash flows of the divisions are positively correla 1. 
Suppose uncertainty enters the sales response.. actions multiplicatively. Let l p, denote 
the price-elasticity of expected demand as before. Then using the first-order conditions. 
w’s can show that 
d’V -f,(p; - c;) ae,, ___ = 
a1u;api ( ) izi Q (8) Pi 
where Q = E(u;) - o(?f;oi;(pi - c;) + Ifj(pj - cj)oij) > 0 by concavity of V. Hence 
d’VldM;dp; is positive (negative) as the price-elasticity of demand decreases (increases) 
with marketing effort. 
Shift in detnnnd 
Suppose that for any state of nature, the demand for products of Division 1 increases 
by a fixed amount. Let the new demand be @{(pi, M,, u) = @i(p,, M,, 11) + 6 where 
6 is the shift parameter. Solving for &jz*/&, we find dp,+*/& > 0 regardless of the type 
of uncertainty.3 Hence the price of any division is increased when demand for its product 
increases. The effect on the other marketing policy variables, however, depends on the 
particular form of uncertainty in the sales response function. 
When uncertainty is exogenous, we can show that 
sign (y ) = sign (&) . 
As a special case, division I will increase its marketing effort when demand for its products 
increases if (a) the price-elasticity decreases when marketing effort increases, and (b) the 
cash flows of the two divisions are positively correlated. Note that, because of the sto- 
chastic interdependence among divisional cash flows, it is misleading to consider each 
division separately even though the divisions are independent SBU’s. 
Similarly, _ 
Finally, the corporate manager wishes the price of Division 2 to increase (decrease) de- 
pending on whether ula is negative (positive). 
Suppose uncertainty in the sales response function is multiplicative. In this case, the 
effect of a change in demand on one division’s marketing effort and the other division’s 
marketing policy is substantially different from the exogenous uncertainty specification. 
In particular, if the demand for Division 1 increases, its own marketing effort increases 
’ Specifically, 
a’v a’v a2v ->O and -z-----z a2v 
apla6 apzas alvf ,a6 
- = 0. 
aiM2a6 
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(decreases) provided the price-elasticity decreases (increases) with marketing effort. Fur- 
thermore, this result is independent of how the divisional cash flows are correlated. How- 
ever, the impact on policy of Division 2 depends on the type of stochastic interdependence 
between the divisions. If u,? > 0. the price of Division 2 products should be increased if 
marketing effort in both divisions has nonsymmetric effects on price sensitivity (e.g., 
higher marketing effort in Division 1 increases price sensitivity but higher marketing effort 
in Division 2 reduces price sensitivity). However, price should be reduced by Division 2 
if marketing effort has symmetric efforts on price sensitivities. Similarly, marketing effort 
in Division 2 should increase (decrease) depending on whether price-sensitivity in Division 
1 increases (decreases) when its own marketing effort increases. If cr12 < 0. all the results 
are reversed. 
Change in effectiveness of marketing effort 
Suppose the effectiveness of marketing effort in Division I increases. Let the new sales 
response function be @i = @, + 6P(M,), where @(M,)lJM, > 0. In contrast to the 
demand shift case, the comparative statics results for all the policy variables depend on 
the type of uncertainty. 
If uncertainty is exogenous, the results are determinate if d2VI&14,~p I > 0. Specifically, 
division 1 should increase both price and marketing effort when its marketing effort be- 
comes more productive. However, the effect on Division 2’s policies depends on the 
stochastic interdependence of cash flows. If uIz 3 0, Division 2 should reduce its price 
unambiguously. However, Division 2 should increase (reduce) its marketing effort de- 
pending on whether an increase in its own marketing effort will increase (decrease) price- 
sensitivity. If uIz < 0, the results are again reversed. 
Increase in uncertainty about demand 
Suppose that the variance of demand conditional on a given marketing policy increases 
with no change in expected sales. In this case, the comparative statics results are deter- 
minate if uncertainty is exogenous. Let the new sales response function for Division 1 be 
@; = f,(p,, M,) + 6u where 6 is the shift parameter. Then, the results are well-defined 
if 4(p, - c,) u,, + 2(p~ - c2) 0 ,z < 0. A sufficient condition is u12 < 0. Division 1 will 
raise its price when uncertainty increases. However, it will increase (reduce) its marketing 
effort depending on whether a’V/aM, ap I is positive (negative). Finally, Division 2 should 
raise its price unambiguously. However, Division 2 should increase (reduce) its marketing 
effort depending on whether ?I’ VldMzdpz is positive (negative). 
SUMMARY 
This paper examines the effect of uncertainty on divisional marketing policies of a 
multidivisional firm. We show that, in general, the marketing policies chosen by the di- 
visional managers of independent Strategic Business Units (SBUs) will be suboptimal, 
even if divisional and corporate managers have homogeneous attitudes to risk. Specifi- 
cally, if uncertainty in the sales response function is exogenous, divisional managers will 
choose prices which are too low when divisional cash flows are negatively correlated. 
However, if uncertainty is multiplicative in the sales response function, the divisional 
managers will choose marketing expenditures which are too low. 
Finally we examine how the corporate manager wishes marketing policy of the divisions 
to be modified when market parameters change. In general, the marketing policy of all 
divisions should be modified even if market conditions change for only one division. This 
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result shows the need for coordination of marketing policies and brings into question the 
effectiveness of the independent SBU organization. In particular, for any parameter shift. 
the nature of the change in marketing policy depends on the manner in which uncertainty 
enters the sales response function and on whether the divisional cash flows are positively 
or negatively correlated. 
APPENDIX: 
COMPARATIVE STATIC METHODOLOGY 
To illustrate the methodology, we examine two of the cases reported in the body of 
the paper. First, we compare the marketing policies chosen by autonomous SBUs with 
optimal corporate marketing policies when uncertainty is exogenous. Second, we deter- 
mine the impact of an increase in the effectiveness of advertising in one division on optimal 
corporate policy when uncertainty in the sales response function is multiplicative. Other 
results can be derived similarly. 
Comparison of di\risionnl policy and optimal corporate policy (exogenous uncertainty) 
In order to compare the divisional policies (~7, MT) and the optimal corporate policies 
(pT*, M:*), it is necessary to determine the signs of ap~*lhlz and dM~*/dol~. Using 
the methodology of comparative statics (Samuelson [9], we obtain 
(A.11 
H 
where subscripts denote derivatives, all derivatives are evaluated at (p?*, MT*) and the 
Hessian determinant H is defined by 
by the concavity of V. 
Differentiating the first-order conditions, we obtain 
V P,“lZ = - 2c4pi - c;) < 0 
V nr,a12 = 0 
V lM,icfZ = 0 
V p 1 Al, = 0 (i # j) 
(A.2) 
V 1 
V PlPZ = - 2aa ,z. 
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Substituting these results in (A.]) and expanding by the first column. we obtain 
13’ 
) R ) = %dp, - cz)Rr, + 4cr%,z(p, - c,)c’.\,,,v, V\,:.,,: (A.3) 
where RI I denotes the minor of the (1, 1) term in R. Now the concavity of V implies that 
RI r < 0. V,+.I,,C,, < 0 (i = 1, 2). Hence / R 1 < 0 provided u rI < 0. From (‘4. I). this implies 
apT* 
- < 0 lf 
au,, 
(512 < 0 (X.4, 
By symmetry, ap?*/aa12 < 0 if oII -=c 0. 
Proceeding in the same way, we can show that 
aMI* . 
- < 0 If 
aol2 
cr17 < 0 
in the multiplicate uncertainty specification of the sales response function. 
Effect of n change in marketing effectiveness (multip1icntir.e uncertainty) 
If the productivity of marketing effort for Division I increases, the new sales response 
function is @; = fl(pl, Ml)uI + 6P(M,) where ap(M,)/&W, > 0. Differentiating the 
new first-order conditions with respect to 6 and evaluating at 6 = 0 we obtain 
V 01s = PCMI) > 0 V JM Ip, = (i #j) 
V iC/lfi = (PI - Cl) $ > 0 VM,ic/z = - cfUlT(P, 
I 
- c,)(p? - c2)F @& (A.5) 
: I z 
V pz6 = V Mz8 = 0 
Solving for ap,**/& we obtain [see (A.l)]: 
where K > 0 is the Hessian determinant of V. 
INI =- 
K 
(A.61 
ah 
Now V,,,, = i’u,z[(p, - cl ap, 
af2 
+ fl][(pz - c2) - + fz] = 0 using the first-order 
ap, 
conditions. Substituting in (A.6) and expanding 1 N ) by the first column we obtain 
(A.7) 
where N,, denotes the minor of the (1, I) term in N. Now IV,, < 0 and (N,?,? V,W,M~ - 
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%A > 0 by the concavity of V. Hence ) N ) > 0 provided VP,+,, > 0. Using (A.6), this 
implies appia6 > 0. 
Similarly, solving for &Vt*/& we obtain 
aktT* -= 
as 
lOI =- 
K 
(A.81 
K 
Expanding 1 0 j by the first column we obtain 
lo I = -(PI - c,g 01, + pv‘+flp, [VM2Mz vpzp2 - vx2pz] > 0 (A.9) 
I 
provided V,,,,,, > 0. Hence - 
aM:* > o, 
as 
Solving for ap~*ldS as above, we obtain 
0 V P?MZ 0 0 
-“P VMn2M~ 0 V&l2M, Ipl 
-(P, - Cdap 
O vLJ,p, VP,,,,, = yq- 
. dM, VM,,W V MIPI V M I M I 
K 
Expanding 1 P 1 by the first row, we obtain 
1 p 1 = -VpzMz VMMZMI [-PVM,,, + (PI - cl) -$$ v,,,,, I. (A.ll) 
(A. 10) 
Suppose the sales of the two products are negatively correlated (i.e. V,w2M, > 0). Then 
sign ( P ( = sign (VpZML ) provided V,+I,~, > 0. Using (A.lO), this implies that sign [ap3*]/ 
a6 = sign (VpZ,M2). Similarly, ifViMzMI < 0, sign I apT* j/d6 = -sign ( Vpz,~lzJ. Finally, 
solving as above for &MT*/&, we can show that sign (aM$*)/as = sign ( V,5ftlrM,) provided 
V MIPI ’ 0. 
1. 
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